PREVENTING GENOCIDE: A REPORT FROM THE FIELD

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Motivation of the GOS

- The GOS is certainly anxious to exploit the potential oil and gas resources of South Darfur, as it did in southern Sudan
- It also values Darfur as a core portion of Sudan's Islamic history, the area which produced the Mahdi at the end of the 19th century
- As well, many of Sudan's soldiers come from Darfur

"The ideal is to have an African solution to an African problem."

Charles Snyder, the senior representative on Sudan for the U.S. Department of State (March 2006)

UNSC Res. 1769 (31 July 2007)

- This UN Security Council resolution set up a hybrid UN + African Union force, UNAMID (UN/AU Hybrid Operation in Darfur)
- 26,000+ peacekeepers are planned
- UNAMID is scheduled to replace AMIS, the African Mission in Sudan, in December 2007

The AMIS Experience up to November 2007

- Lack of personnel
- Lack of transport
- Lack of freedom of movement
- Lack of weapons
- Lack of patrolling activity

Lack of Personnel

- At end of Sept. 2007, AMIS had only 5,454 personnel of a planned 6,171
- Darfur has 2 million internally displaced persons and a further 2 million people endangered by conflict
- AMIS lacks civilian police personnel and a civil affairs component with political officers and human rights monitors

Lack of Transport

- AMIS now has armoured personnel carriers provided by Canada. The Government of Sudan (GOS) delayed delivery of them for six months in 2005 in Port Sudan
- AMIS has no military helicopters
- AMIS has 24 civilian helicopters and pilots, paid for by the Govt. of Canada
- The pilots do not fly when they feel endangered and the GOS withholds helicopter fuel when AMIS wants to use them to observe fighting
- AMIS has no fixed wing aircraft and must lease them from the GOS

Lack of Freedom of Movement

- AMIS needs clearance each time it flies aircraft from airports
- Patrols are often refused permission to travel by GOS claims that the roads are unsafe
- The GOS delays issuing visas to AMIS personnel and withholds travel permits to travel in Darfur
- In some areas, the GOS imposes travel curfews starting at 7pm

Lack of Weapons

- AMIS soldiers are equipped only with machine guns
- They are outgunned by the Janjaweed, the GOS and rebel groups

Lack of Patrolling Activity

- AMIS was successful when it maintained constant patrolling
- When AMIS is not present, internally-displaced persons (IDPs) are most vulnerable
- On some days, in the whole of Darfur, there is only one patrol recorded per day
- Some IDP camps have become “no go” areas for AMIS due to the hostility of the IDPs who suspect AMIS of collaboration with the GOS

AMIS Humiliated in October 2007

Town destroyed

The town of Haskanita, controlled by Sudanese government forces, was destroyed in an apparent retaliation after Darfur rebels attacked and killed 10 peacekeepers last week.

SOURCES: ESRI AP

Issues Delaying UNAMID's Deployment for December 2007

- Troop composition
- Helicopters
- Heavy aircraft and landing rights
- Land for bases
- Freedom of movement
- Lack of personnel
- Lack of transport
- Lack of freedom of movement
- Lack of disarmament mandate
- Public reporting

Troop composition

- UNSC called for UNAMID to be predominantly African in character and from African countries
- GOS has not yet accepted list of African countries submitted by UN and AU
- UN proposed 16,000 soldiers from Africa and 4,000 from non-African countries
- Sudan and other African countries objected in Sept. 2007 to engineers from Norway and infantry from Norway + Thailand
- Chinese engineers and 2 battalions from Rwanda and Nigeria expected momentarily to arrive

Helicopters

- Jordan has offered UNAMID attack helicopters, but the GOS refused to allow them
- UN has requested 18 transport helicopters and 6 light tactical helicopters for UNAMID, but member states have still not agreed to supply them

Heavy Aircraft and Landing Rights

- GOS has denied landing rights to UNAMID for heavy transport aircraft, forcing the UN to bring heavy equipment through Port Sudan and delaying deliveries by months

Land for UNAMID Bases

- The UN and the GOS agreed to allow UNAMID Headquarters to be built in Nyala, which has better access to Darfur's road network, a better airport, a railway line, and an all-weather road to Khartoum
- But the GOS has delayed signing an agreement for the land and the right to drill a water borehole in Nyala, so HQ may have to stay in al-Fasher, where 600 AMIS personnel now occupy a base built for 356

Freedom of Movement

- The GOS has not yet granted UNAMID freedom of movement including night flights and exclusion from curfew decrees
- The status of forces agreement is still not completed and signed

Disarmament

- UNSC Resolution 1769 fails to mention disarmament
- It only discusses the monitoring of arms
- IDP camps are increasingly becoming militarized and Darfur's roads are often unsafe, replete with hijackings and attacks on humanitarian vehicles
- An effective disarmament, demobilization and reintegration progamme is essential for UNAMID to succeed

Public Reporting

- UNAMID has not yet obtained firm guarantees that it will be able to publish reports on its own without approval from the GOS and other parties to the Darfur conflict

If UNAMID is a Lame Duck, What Then?

- UNAMID may be as dysfunctional as UNAMIS
- With 400,000 dead and over 2 million displaced by the conflict in Darfur, and millions more threatened by famine, disease and lack of security in their villages, what can be done if UNAMID fails due to sabotage by the GOS and some rebel groups in Darfur?

Contingency Options

1. Let the GOS play its usual game of delay, sabotage and deception, leaving UNAMID ineffective and dysfunctional
2. Introduce powerful non-military sanctions on the GOS through new Security Council resolutions—but these may be vetoed by China and/or Russia
3. Recognize the need to empower carefully chosen Darfurian actors by providing them with key arms and supplies, including Stinger anti-aircraft missiles

Shoulder launched, air defence Stinger missile

Length: 5 feet
Weight: 12.5 pounds
Weight fully armed: 34.5 lbs.
Range: 1-8 kms
Ceiling: 10,000 feet
Speed: Supersonic in flight
Crew: two
Guidance system: Fire & forget passive infrared, heat seeking
Rate of fire: 1 missile every 3-5 seconds
Cost: $38,000

In Afghanistan the basic 5-mile-range Stinger missile downed over 270 Soviet aircraft (a 79% combat success rate), and helped to stop air assault operations and force Soviet withdrawal

Darfur and Its Neighbors

Destroyed Villages Reported by Darfur Refugees at Camps in Chad



Janjaweed at work in Darfur

Acts of Violence Reported by Darfur Refugees


Darfur Refugees Report Numerous Acts of Violence*
Chart 1
Percent witnessing or experiencing the following:
Killing of family member
61%
Killing of non-family member
67%
Shooting
44%
Death from displacement
28%
Abduction
25%
Beating
21%
Rape
16%
Hearing racial epithets
33%
Village destruction
81%
Theft of livestock
80%
Aerial bombing
67%
Destruction of personal property
55%
Looting of personal property
47%
*Reported atrocities were included in the data set only if the respondent directly witnessed the event. For the purposes of this study, a respondent is considered to have "directly witnessed" an atrocity if she or he was an eyewitness to the event, visually confirmed the death of victims, or, in cases of rape, was directly told about the atrocity by the victim. Hearsay accounts were excluded from the data set.
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
Darfur: IDP Concentrations and Refugee Locations - July 2004
Iridimi
15,200 Refugees
Touloum
16,200 Refugees
Mile
8,500 Refugees
Kounoungo
5,000 Refugees
Farchana
11,600 Refugees
Breidjing
27,500 Refugees
Djabal
11,200 Refugees
Guz-Amer
18,000 Refugees
CHAD
North Darfur
West Darfur
South Darfur
Umm Baru
Kornoi
Tina
Kulbus
Hallilate
Jabel Moon
Sirba
Kandisbeg
Al Geneina
Um Tajouk
Kerenek
Bardai Sarra
Asraf Omra
Kabkabiya
Fato Barnou
Kutum
Melit
Al Fasher
Tawilah
Zam Zam
Mastori
Berda
Kanyo Hanatta
Azurah
Habilah
Um Dukhum
Um Kher
Foro Buranga
Bindisi
Mukjar
Sisi
Mornei
Zalingei
Nertiti
Thur
Nyertete
Gereida
Kornoi
Rashaba
Umo
Kass
Dobo
Gereida
Shataya
Um Labasa
Kubum
Nyala
Tulshs
Kalma
Yass
Khor Omar/Ed Daein
Golo
Mellem
Mershing/Manawashi
0
60
120
240 km
The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.
Map produced by ReliefWeb – 6 July 2004
IDP Concentrations
State Capital
1 - 10,000 IDPs
10,001 - 20,000 IDPs
20,001 - 45,000 IDPs
45,001 - 95,000 IDPs
Refugee Camps
Sudan Major Roads
Chad Roads


Where Oxfam is Working in Darfur and Chad Sep05
North Darfur
West Darfur
South Darfur
Chad
Amnabak
Kounoungo
Gaga
Farchana
Breidjing
Al Geneina
Birka Saria
Kabkabiya
Abushouk
Al Salaam
Al Fashir
Saraf Omra
Tawilah/ Dalih
Shangil Tobayi
Momei
Habila
Garsila
For a Burunga
Bindisi
Kass
Nyala
Kalma
Al Salaam
Um Dukhun
Gereida
Key
State Capital
IDP/refugee site where Oxfam is working
0 km
250 km

Oil Concessions And Reserved Blocks in Sudan

When African Union troops were welcome

The UNAMID Flag

Rail Transportation In Sudan

Nyala



Stinger Missile, Afghanistan

You need not be a professional soldier to operate a Stinger



Rupert Bazambanza's perspective

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